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Tough Love:  Should We Analyze 
Federal Emergency Management Agency 
Disaster Planning Under  
the National Environmental Policy Act? 
Katherine Hausrath* 
Introduction 
The country sat transfixed, watching the streets of New Orleans 
fill with water in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.  On the Internet, on 
the evening news, and in print journalism, increasingly desperate 
people begged for government assistance.1  The mayor of New Or-
leans, C. Ray Nagin, pleaded for help from federal officials.  Their 
calls highlighted the fact that many coastal areas cannot adequately 
respond to hurricanes without federal assistance. 
Tropical storms have been increasing in intensity since the mid-
dle of the last century.2  The 2005 hurricane season saw a record-
breaking 27 tropical storms; their names used Greek letters for the 
first time, because more than 21 named storms had occurred.3  De-
spite the risk, people continue to locate in hurricane-prone coastal 
areas4 and continue to rebuild after each natural disaster.  At first 
glance, rebuilding, even in a hurricane zone, seems like the natural 
human reaction.  As President George W. Bush stated after Hurricane 
* Assistant Attorney General for Environmental Enforcement, Office of the Illi-
nois Attorney General.  This article does not reflect the opinion of the Office of the 
Illinois Attorney General. 
1. Josh White & Peter Whoriskey, Planning, Response Are Faulted, WASH. POST,
Sept. 2, 2005, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/  
article/2005/09/01/AR2005090102428.html. 
2. Kerry Emanuel, Increasing Destructiveness of Tropical Cyclones Over the Past 30
Years, 436 NATURE 686, 687 (Aug. 4, 2005), available at ftp://texmex.mit.edu/pub/ 
emanuel/PAPERS/NATURE03906.pdf. 
3. Adrian Sainz, Tropical Storm Zeta Forms in Atlantic, ASSOC. PRESS, Dec. 30, 2005,
available at http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=1456893.  There are only twenty-
one named storms because Q, U, X, Y, and Z are not used for tropical storm names. 
John Pain, Tropical Storm Wilma Upgraded to Hurricane, ASSOC. PRESS, Oct. 18, 2005, avail-
able at http://abcnews.go.com/US/Weather/wireStory?id=1226096. 
4. John McCormick, Americans Moving into Harm's Way, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 8, 2005 at C8.
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Katrina, "we will not just rebuild, we will build higher and better."5  
Regardless of political affiliation, it was seen as a mark of triumph 
over adversity to proclaim that New Orleans would be rebuilt in the 
same spot, better than ever.6 
However, this reaction might be too simplistic, given the inher-
ent risks of building in hurricane-prone areas.  The country deserves a 
non-politicized analysis of the environmental and human costs asso-
ciated with building and living in hurricane-prone areas.  Fortunately, 
our legal system already has a framework in place for analyzing the 
environmental costs of major federal actions: the National Environ-
mental Policy Act ("NEPA").7 
NEPA's environmental analysis sections should be applied to 
Federal Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA") disaster planning, 
particularly the National Flood Insurance Program and the National 
Hurricane Program.  An Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") 
would fulfill the legislative intent of NEPA.  This EIS would allow the 
public and the government to assess the costs and benefits of disas-
ter funding, and would facilitate a more transparent decision-making 
process.  Additionally, analyzing the environmental impacts of devel-
oping in hurricane-prone areas would allow rational decisions to be 
made before a disaster happens.  Part I of this article will discuss the 
framework of NEPA, including relevant Supreme Court cases.  Part II 
will look at FEMA programs that deal with hurricanes and floods, and 
how these programs have affected the development of coastal areas. 
In Part III, this article will assess the environmental and human toll of 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  Finally, Part IV of this article will argue 
that preparation of an EIS by FEMA would fulfill the purpose and re-
quirements of NEPA and perhaps help save human lives from the 
next disastrous storm. 
I. Relevant NEPA Provisions and Cases
A. NEPA's Mandate
Enacted in 1970, NEPA creates a "national policy [to] encourage
productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environ-
ment"8 and is intended to assure everyone "safe, healthful, produc-
tive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings."9  As part 
5. President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation (Sept. 15, 2006) (tran-
script available at http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/15/bush.transcript/). 
6. Donna Brazile, I Will Rebuild With You, Mr. President, WASH. POST, Sept. 17,
2005, at A21, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2005/09/16/AR2005091602167_pf.html. 
7. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2006). 
8. § 4321.
9. § 4331(b)(2).
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of its rationale for passing NEPA, Congress noted that human activity 
has a significant impact on the natural environment, listing examples 
such as increased population growth, urban and industrial expan-
sion, resource extraction, and technological advances.10 
NEPA mandates that all administrative agencies "consider the 
consequences of their actions on the environment."11  NEPA does not 
require an agency to choose the most environmentally friendly op-
tion, or to come to any particular conclusion when making a decision 
or undertaking a project.12  Instead, as an "action-forcing" statute, 
NEPA requires certain procedural steps to be taken to analyze the 
environmental effects of agency proposals and actions.13  One of the 
most important of these steps under NEPA, and the focus of this arti-
cle, is the creation of an EIS. 
NEPA directs federal agencies to include in all "major Federal 
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" 
a detailed statement on:  (i) the environmental impact of the pro-
posed action, (ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be 
avoided should the proposal be implemented, (iii) alternatives to the 
proposed action, (iv) the relationship between local short-term uses 
of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of 
long-term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable 
commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed 
action, should it be implemented.14 
The EIS requirement of NEPA serves two purposes.  First, it aims 
to improve agency decision-making, and not simply to "generate pa-
perwork."15  By requiring a detailed analysis of environmental im-
pacts, NEPA "ensures that important effects will not be overlooked or 
underestimated only to be discovered after resources have been 
committed."16  Accordingly, an EIS requires an agency to take a "hard 
look" at the environmental consequences of a proposed action, prior 
to taking the proposed action.17 
Second, an EIS provides relevant information to all citizens, in-
cluding affected parties who might want to play a part in the deci-
sion-making process.18  Publication of the EIS allows the public to 
10. § 4331(a).
11. MATTHEW BENDER & CO., INC., TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 9.01 (2002)
[hereinafter TREATISE] (quoting S. REP. NO. 91-296, at 14 (1969)). 
12. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989).
13. Id. at 349.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c).
15. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c) (2005).
16. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. at 349.
17. Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 374 (1989).
18. Id.
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understand the impacts of a proposed action, and comment upon the 
action, and assures the public that the agency has adequately ana-
lyzed the environmental impacts of a proposed action.19 
The Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ"), an agency au-
thorized by NEPA, has promulgated implementing regulations that 
contain specific requirements for EISs.  The regulations direct agen-
cies to write succinct EISs,20 and to concentrate on alternatives as 
well as the salient issues.21  Each EIS must address the environment 
that will be affected by the proposed federal action as well as each of 
the alternatives for the action.22 
1. Major Federal Actions
Although NEPA requires an EIS for all major federal actions, the 
definition of a "major federal action" is not completely clear in NEPA 
or its implementing regulations.  The CEQ regulations define a "ma-
jor federal action" as an action that may be "major" and is potentially 
subject to federal control or responsibility.23  The term "major" does 
not have an independent meaning separate from the term "signifi-
cantly affecting."24  In other words, NEPA does not intend the acting 
agency to analyze whether an action is major and whether the action 
significantly affects the environment.  Instead, the terms are inter-
preted in conjunction with each other.25 
The word "action" includes activities, projects, and programs 
that the acting federal agency finances, conducts, regulates, or ap-
proves.26  Action also refers to agency rules, regulations, policies, and 
procedures, and an agency's implementation of a specific statutory 
program.27  Budget appropriation requests are not "actions" that re-
quire an EIS, because an appropriation simply provides funds for au-
thorized programs.28  Accordingly, the underlying action might be 
subject to an EIS, but once the action is authorized, the funding does 
not require an EIS.29 
In order to determine whether an action "significantly" affects 
the environment, the agency must look at both the "context" of the 
19. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983).
20. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.7 (2005).
21. § 1502.14.
22. § 1502.15.
23. § 1508.18.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. TREATISE § 9.02, supra note 11.
27. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(b) (2005).
28. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 349 (1979).
29. Id. at 362.
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action and the "intensity" of the action's impact.30  The context of the 
action includes how the action affects society at the local, regional, 
and national level.31  Several factors address the intensity of an action, 
including: (1) the effect of the proposed action on public health and 
safety; (2) unique characteristics of the geographic area; (3) how con-
troversial the effects may be on the environment; (4) how uncertain 
the risks are to the environment; (5) whether the action will establish 
a precedent; (6) the cumulative effect of this action when combined 
with other actions; (7) the impact on scientifically, culturally, or his-
torically important resources; (8) the impact on endangered or threat-
ened species; and (9) whether the action violates environmental pro-
tection laws at the federal, state, or local level.32 
 2. When Must an EIS Be Prepared, and What Must It Analyze?
NEPA directs the agency to analyze all environmental impacts 
and adverse effects of the action that cannot be avoided.33  The defini-
tion of "effect" in the CEQ regulations includes both direct and indi-
rect effects.34  The CEQ regulations treat the term "effect" and "im-
pact" interchangeably. 35  Direct effects are impacts from the action 
that "occur at the same time and place."36 
Indirect effects are impacts "caused by the action and are later 
in time or farther removed in distance."37  These effects must still be 
"reasonably foreseeable."38  The CEQ enumerates several specific in-
direct effects, including "growth inducing effects and other effects re-
lated to induced changes in the pattern of land use, population den-
sity or growth rate, and related effects on air and water and other 
natural systems, including ecosystems."39 
The U.S. Supreme Court describes NEPA as having an "inherent" 
"rule of reason" that governs whether an agency must prepare an 
EIS.40  The agency must determine whether the EIS would provide 
useful information necessary to the decision-making process.41  In 
other words, if the EIS would not help the agency understand the en-
30. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (2005).
31. § 1508.27.
32. Id.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c).
34. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (2005).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S 752, 767 (2004).
41. Id.
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vironmental consequences of its proposed project,42 then it would be 
unreasonable to require an agency to prepare an EIS.  Thus, it would 
violate the "rule of reason" to require an agency prepare an EIS for an 
action it has no discretion in performing.43 
For an environmental impact to be included in an EIS, the 
agency's action must have more than a "but for" causal relationship 
with a particular environmental effect.44  Instead, the proposed action 
must have "a reasonably close causal relationship" to the environ-
mental effect.45  This analysis is akin to the proximate cause analysis 
in torts law.46 
An agency need not consider the psychological harm that might 
result to the public from an action it takes.  In Metropolitan Edison Com-
pany v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 774 (1983), the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission was not required to analyze potential psy-
chological harm to residents from the risk of another accident if the 
Three Mile Island nuclear power plants were reopened.47  The Court 
held that psychological harm did not arise from an impact on the 
physical environment, and accordingly, NEPA did not apply.48 
3. Alternatives in an EIS
In the discussion of each alternative to a proposed action, the 
federal agency must analyze eight factors:49  (1) the direct effects of 
the action and the significance of these effects, (2) the indirect effects 
of the action and the significance of these effects, (3) possible con-
flicts between the proposed action and other governmental "land use 
plans, policies and controls for the area concerned," (4) the environ-
mental effects of the different alternatives, (5) the "energy require-
ments and conservation potential" of the different alternatives, (6) 
the "natural or depletable resource requirements" of each alternative, 
(7) impacts on urban quality and historic and cultural resources, and
(8) the capacity to "mitigate adverse environmental impacts."
42. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 (2005).
43. Dep’t of Transp., 541 U.S. at 769.  For a further discussion of this issue, see
infra the text accompanying Section I.B.3. 
44. See Dep’t of Transp., 541 U.S at 767.
45. Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 774 (1983).
46. Id.
47. Metro. Edison Co., 460 U.S. at 779.
48. Id. at 774.
49. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16 (2005).
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4. Mitigation Measures and "Worst Case Analyses"
An EIS need not contain a fully developed plan for mitigating 
negative environmental impacts.50  Accordingly, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has held that the Forest Service may issue a special land use 
permit for a ski resort, without creating or implementing a detailed 
plan to mitigate adverse effects on air quality and an off-site popula-
tion of mule deer that used the area for a winter range.51 
Despite that ruling, an EIS must contain a detailed investigation 
of possible mitigation measures52 in order to analyze the severity of 
various environmental effects.  A discussion of mitigation measures 
fulfills the "action-forcing" nature of NEPA.53  CEQ regulations direct 
an agency to consider possible mitigation measures when outlining 
the scope of the EIS,54 when looking at possible alternatives to the 
proposed action,55 when discussing possible consequences of an ac-
tion,56 and when explaining a final decision.57 
Furthermore, an EIS need not contain a "worst case analysis" of 
possible environmental impacts.58  Instead of including a worst case 
analysis, an agency must summarize credible scientific evidence that 
is relevant to an evaluation of the adverse impacts.59  Additionally, 
the agency must evaluate the likelihood of a particular environmental 
impact by using "theoretical approaches or research methods gener-
ally accepted in the scientific community."60 
50. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. at 359.
51. Id.
52. Under CEQ regulations, “mitigation” includes: “(a) Avoiding the impact al-
together by not taking a certain action or parts of an action; (b) Minimizing impacts 
by limiting the degree or magnitude of the action and its implementation; (c) Rectify-
ing the impact by repairing, rehabilitating, or restoring the affected environment; (d) 
Reducing or eliminating the impact over time by preservation and maintenance op-
erations during the life of the action; or (e) Compensating for the impact by replacing 
or providing substitute resources or environments.”  40 C.F.R. § 1508.20 (2005). 
53. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. at 352.
54. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(b)(3) (2005).
55. § 1502.14(f).
56. § 1502.16(h).
57. § 1505.2(c).
58. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. at 359.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 354 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b) (1987) (internal quotations omitted). 
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B. When Is an EIS Not Required?
1. Categorical Exclusions
An agency is not required to prepare an EIS if the proposed ac-
tion is "categorically excluded."61  A "categorical exclusion" is defined 
as a group of actions that do not have a significant effect — individu-
ally or cumulatively — on the human environment.62  To implement a 
categorical exclusion, the agency must have adopted regulations 
stating that this category of actions has no significant effect.  These 
regulations also must provide for the preparation of an EIS when a 
normally excluded action in actuality has a significant environmental 
effect.63 
2. Environmental Assessments with a Finding of No
Significant Impact
CEQ regulations also allow an agency to prepare an Environ-
mental Assessment ("EA") when the agency's proposed action is not 
categorically excluded from the EIS requirements, but an EIS is not 
clearly required.64  An EA is a "concise public document"65 intended to 
"[b]riefly provide sufficient evidence and analysis" to determine 
whether it is necessary for an agency to prepare an EIS.66  If, after pre-
paring an EA, an agency decides that an EIS is not necessary, the 
agency will issue a "finding of no significant impact" ("FONSI").67  A 
FONSI must detail the agency's rationale for why the proposed action 
will not have a significant impact on the human environment.68 
3. The Agency Has No Discretion to Prevent the Proposed
Action
An agency is not required to prepare an EIS when the agency 
has no discretion to prevent the environmental impact at issue, be-
cause the agency cannot be considered a legally relevant cause of the 
environmental effect.69  Thus, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Ad-
ministration ("FMCSA") did not violate NEPA when it did not analyze 
the environmental effect of an increase in vehicle traffic after Mexican 
61. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2005).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. §§ 1501.4(a)-(b).
65. § 1508.9(a).
66. § 1508.9(a).
67. § 1501.4.
68. § 1508.13.
69. See Dep’t of Transp., 541 U.S. at 770.
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trucks were again allowed to operate in the U.S.70  FMCSA did con-
sider environmental impacts from "traffic and congestion, public 
safety and health, air quality, [and] noise," as well as "socioeconomic 
factors, and environmental justice" from implementing safety regula-
tions associated with lifting the moratorium.71  However, FMCSA issued 
a FONSI regarding the increase of Mexican truck traffic in the U.S., 
stating that any increase in traffic would result from the President lift-
ing the moratorium, and not from implementing the safety regula-
tions.72 
In holding for FMCSA, the U.S. Supreme Court relied on the 
agency's limited discretion in issuing registrations.  The agency must 
register all domestic or foreign motor carriers that are "willing and 
able to comply with the applicable safety, fitness, and financial re-
sponsibility requirements."73  FMCSA is not authorized to establish or 
enforce any environmental requirements, including emissions con-
trols that are unrelated to motor carrier safety.74  Ultimately, the 
Court relied upon the fact that the President lifted the moratorium on 
Mexican motor carrier certification, and FMCSA had no ability to 
overturn his decision.75 
Therefore, because FMCSA could not change the environmental 
impact from the increased Mexican motor vehicle use in the U.S., it 
was not necessary for the agency's EA to consider the environmental 
effects arising from this increased use.76 
II. FEMA's Hurricane Disaster Funding and Its Impact on
Human Behavior
A. FEMA's National Flood Insurance Program
As early as the 1950s, Congress realized that private insurance
companies would not provide flood insurance at an affordable price, 
because of the disastrous nature of floods and the lack of an actuarial 
rate structure that accurately reflected the risk of flooding in certain 
areas of the country.77  Congress created the National Flood Insur-
ance Program ("NFIP") through the 1968 National Flood Insurance Act 
70. Id. at 756.
71. Id. at 761.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 758-759 (internal quotations omitted).
74. Id. at 759.
75. Id. at 766.
76. Id. at 756.
77. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (“FEMA”), National Flood Insurance
Program Description, (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.fema.gov/doc/library/ nfipde-
scrip.doc [hereinafter NFIP Description]. 
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("1968 Act") in an attempt to reduce the cost of taxpayer-funded dis-
aster relief after floods78 and to control the damage caused by 
floods.79  After realizing that many communities were not participat-
ing in the NFIP, Congress enacted the Flood Disaster Protection Act 
of 1973 ("1973 Act").80  This Act prohibits federal assistance in the 
purchase or construction of buildings as well as some disaster assis-
tance in the floodplains of any community that did not take part in 
the NFIP by July 1,1975, or within one year of being recognized as 
flood-prone.81 
The NFIP provides federally funded flood insurance to home-
owners, business owners, and renters.82  In exchange, communities 
agree to adopt floodplain ordinances.83  Almost 20,000 U.S. communi-
ties participate, 84 and more than 4.6 million Americans carry flood 
insurance through the NFIP.85 
In 1994, Congress amended the 1968 Act through the National 
Flood Insurance Reform Act.86  Through this amendment, Congress 
encouraged state and local governments to restrict development of 
land exposed to floods, encouraged lending and credit institutions to 
further the objectives of the NFIP, and authorized further studies of 
flood hazards in order to reappraise the NFIP and its effect on land 
use.87  Congress noted that annual losses from floods and mudslides 
are increasing at a significant rate, due mainly to accelerating devel-
opment and higher population density in areas prone to those haz-
ards.88  Additionally, the withholding or granting of federal loans and 
insurance often influences choices in land use and construction.89 
78. According to FEMA, disaster assistance after a flood is reduced by $1 bil-
lion a year because of the floodplain management component of the NFIP and the 
purchase of flood insurance.  FEMA, National Flood Insurance Program, (May 5, 2006), 
available at http://www.fema.gov/business/nfip.  FEMA postulates that $1 in disaster 
assistance is saved for every $3 paid in flood insurance claims.  Id. 
79. Id.
80. NFIP Description, supra note 77.
81. Id.
82. FEMA, Answers to Questions about the NFIP, (June 8, 2006) available at
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/press/katrina_after/nfip_faqs.pdf  [hereinafter NFIP FAQs]. 
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. FEMA, National Flood Insurance Program Announces Simplified Adjustment Process
For Policyholders Affected By Hurricane Katrina, (Sept 20, 2005), available at 
http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=19018. 
86. National Flood Insurance Reform, Pub. L. No. 103-325, § 511 (1994), (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4129 (2000)). 
87. 42 U.S.C. § 4001(e) (2000).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 4002 (2006).
89. Id.
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FEMA maps floodplains in the U.S.  The mapping is intended to 
raise awareness of flood hazards and facilitates actuarial assessments 
for flood insurance.90  FEMA designates land in the one-hundred-year 
floodplain, or land that has a one percent or greater risk of flooding 
in any given year, as a Special Flood Hazard Area. 91  To receive financ-
ing from a federally insured or regulated institution to purchase, con-
struct, or renovate structures in Special Flood Hazard Areas, an owner 
is required to purchase flood insurance under the NFIP.92  Although it 
is not required for everyone, any property owner in a community par-
ticipating in the NFIP may purchase flood insurance.93 
The 1968 Act distinguishes between buildings built before and 
after the creation of the NFIP.94  Flood insurance on buildings con-
structed prior to the Act is heavily subsidized by the NFIP; after the 
date of initial flood mapping, insurance for new or significantly im-
proved buildings is not subsidized and reflects the total risk.95  These 
buildings are known as Post-Flood Insurance Rate Map ("Post-FIRM") 
buildings.96 
NFIP insurance policies cover up to $250,000 for residential 
homes.97  Coverage for a business can extend up to $500,000 for the 
structure.98  The insurance policy also protects the contents of the 
building; the policy covers up to $1 million for a residential building99 
and a business can receive up to $500,000 in coverage for the con-
tents of the building.100 
The NFIP is funded through the National Flood Insurance Fund, 
which was created by the 1968 Act.101  Premiums are deposited into 
the fund, and in turn the fund pays claims, as well as operating and 
administrative costs.102  If necessary, FEMA is authorized to borrow 
money from the General Treasury if the National Flood Insurance 
Fund does not contain enough money to pay necessary claims and 
90. NFIP FAQs, supra note 82.
91. NFIP Description, supra note 77, at 7.
92. NFIP FAQs, supra note 82.
93. Id.
94. NFIP Description, supra note 77, at 26.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 27.
97. Id. at 25.
98. FEMA, How Much Coverage is Available? (June 7, 2006), http://www.fema.gov/
business/nfip/cover.shtm#49. 
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. NFIP Description, supra note 77, at 2.
102. Id. at 8.
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costs.103  Congress recently raised the NFIP's limit for borrowing 
money from the treasury to $20.8 billion because the fund does not 
contain sufficient money to pay current claims.104  In 2005, before Hur-
ricanes Katrina and Rita, the limit for borrowing was set at $1.5 bil-
lion.105 
In the 2004 fiscal year, the NFIP paid out $1,692,460 in Alabama, 
$16,959,530 in Florida, $19,570,591 in Louisiana, and $2,442,763 in 
Mississippi.106  FEMA estimates claims from Hurricanes Rita and 
Katrina will top $24 billion, which is more than the total of all claims 
made in the history of the NFIP.107 
B. FEMA's National Hurricane Program
FEMA's National Hurricane Program leads the federal response
to hurricanes.  The program has a three-pronged approach:  (1) hurri-
cane damage response; (2) hurricane preparedness; and (3) mitiga-
tion before a hurricane occurs.108  The program's most important goal 
for the purpose of this section is the effective response to hurricane 
damage.  In order to achieve this goal, FEMA, along with state and 
local governments, helps provide emergency evacuation.109  FEMA is 
also supposed to help develop emergency evacuation shelters and 
plans, and raise public awareness of hurricane hazards.110 
FEMA provides emergency supplies, housing, and financial as-
sistance for rebuilding.111  After Hurricane Katrina, FEMA gave hous-
ing assistance to more than 700,000 people.112  In October 2005, two 
months after Hurricane Katrina made landfall, FEMA was still hous-
ing 31,500 people in temporary shelters.113 
Under the Transitional Housing Assistance Program, FEMA pro-
vided $2,358 per household to people made homeless by Hurricane 
103. Jim Abrams, Assoc. Press, Flood Insurance Agency Gets Boost; Congress Agrees
More Money Can Be Borrowed to Pay Storm Victims, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 17, 2006,  at A21. 
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. FEMA, FLOOD INSURANCE: TOTAL CLAIM PAYMENTS BY STATE, SEPTEMBER 30,
2003 - SEPTEMBER 30, 2004, April 17, 2006, http://www.fema.gov/business/nfip/ 
statistics/totclmpaydata2004.shtm. 
107. Abrams, supra note 103.
108. NFIP FAQs, supra note 82.
109. FEMA, National Hurricane Program, Aug. 23, 2006, http://www.fema.gov/
plan/prevent/nhp/index.shtm. 
110. Id.
111. FEMA,  Disaster Support Resources, July 31, 2006, http://www.fema.gov/
business/nfip/disaster_res.shtm. 
112. Spencer S. Hsu, Housing Aid Called Too Much, Too Little, WASH. POST, Oct. 12,
2005, at A06. 
113. Dahleen Glanton, Evacuees Find Community in Georgia Hotel, CHI. TRIB., Feb.
12, 2006, at C1. 
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Katrina.114  This money was intended to cover three months' rent.115  
These payments could be extended for up to eighteen months if the 
renter could prove that her monthly rent exceeded $786.116  As of No-
vember 5, 2005, 488,000 people had received rental assistance under 
this program.117  However, Congress has limited FEMA aid of all kinds 
— including home repairs — to $26,200 per family.118 
Additionally, FEMA ordered 125,000 trailers for evacuees to live 
in while their homes were being repaired.119  The trailer program is es-
timated to cost significantly over $2 billion.120  FEMA also spent $236 
million to place 7,000 people on three Carnival Cruise Lines ships.121 
Finally, FEMA placed thousands of people in hotel rooms.  Up 
until an October 15th deadline, FEMA paid $8.3 million a day to keep 
549,000 people in hotel rooms, although Hurricane Katrina made 
landfall at the end of August.122  The average room rate was $59 per 
night.123  In November 2005, well past the deadline, FEMA was still 
paying for 69,000 hotel rooms.124  As of February 2006, FEMA ex-
pended $542 million to house people in hotels and motels.125 
In Louisiana alone, FEMA's costs for Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita exceeded $12 billion for immediate response, as well as counsel-
ing, legal services, housing, living expenses, and property replace-
ment, among other relief.126 
C. Moral Hazard — How Insurance Changes the Behavior of the
Insured
Economists use the concept of moral hazard to illustrate that be-
ing insured may change people's behavior.127  The theory postulates 
that an actor who is not paying for a given risk is more likely to take 
the risk or use the resource.  For example, the savings-and-loan de-
114. FEMA, Disaster Support Resources, supra note 111.
115. Id.
116. Hsu, supra note 112.
117. Andrew Martin, Hitches Show in FEMA Trailer Plan, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 5, 2005, at C1. 
118. Hsu, supra note 112.  This $26,200 limit does not apply to flood damage claims. 
119. Martin, supra note 117.
120. Id.
121. Hsu, supra note 112.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Martin, supra note 117.
125. Glanton, supra note 113.
126. FEMA Press Release, Six Months After the Storms, (Feb. 28, 2006),
http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=23903. 
127. Malcolm Gladwell, The Moral Hazard Myth: The Bad Idea Behind Our Failed
Health-Care System, NEW YORKER, Aug. 29, 2005, available at http://www.newyorker.com 
/fact/content/articles/050829fa_fact. 
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bacle of the 1980s was largely induced by newly deregulated savings 
and loans that relied on federal insurance when making extremely 
risky investments.128 
Moral hazard is a type of maximizing behavior.129  An actor exam-
ines the costs and benefits of an action, and when the benefits ex-
ceed the risks, the person will take the action.130  The theory of moral 
hazard does not necessarily require that the person intentionally un-
dertake the risk; if the person simply does not take any action to 
avoid the risk, then the same result occurs.131 
Moral hazard can be the result of governmental action.132  Pro-
grams that are designed to help people in need can encourage — or 
fail to discourage — people to place themselves in need.133 Welfare 
and unemployment programs can persuade some people to work 
less.134  Accordingly, government programs that protect the public 
against misfortune can have the unintended consequence of increas-
ing the use of a given government resource.135 
In amending the 1968 Act, Congress noted that the theory of 
moral hazard can influence consumer decisions of where to live, 
where to build a house, and where to establish a business.  Congress 
found that federal loans and insurance are determinative factors in 
land use and construction choices.136 
 Studies of population shifts show that despite the risk, Ameri-
cans continue to move into hurricane-prone areas.137  According to a 
Chicago Tribune study, approximately one in eight Americans live in 
coastal counties between Texas and Massachusetts.138  Almost half of 
these coastal counties experienced more rapid growth than the na-
tion as a whole between 2000 and 2004.139  These counties grew by 5.1 
percent between 2000 and 2004, as opposed to 4.3 percent for the 
128. Id.
129. Robert E. Schenk, CYBERECONOMICS: AN ANALYSIS OF UNINTENDED CONSE-
QUENCES, Overview: Problems of Information, Risk, and Exclusion (2006), available at 
http://ingrimayne.com/econ/RiskExclusion/Risk.html. 
130. Id.  Clearly, some people will not deliberately take an advantageous ac-
tion due to ethical or moral objections. 
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 42 U.S.C. § 4002 (2006).
137. McCormick, supra note 4.
138. Id.
139. Id.  The study looked at 125 coastal counties along the Gulf of Mexico and
the Atlantic Ocean, excluding counties protected by Chesapeake Bay.  Id. 
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U.S. as a whole.140  Since 2000, certain counties in Florida, Texas, Ala-
bama, and North and South Carolina grew by more than 10 percent.141 
Florida, where hurricanes most commonly make landfall, has 14 
of the nation's 100 fastest-growing counties.142  With the exception of 
Orlando, most of Florida's growth occurs along the coast.  The popu-
lation along Florida's coast has increased from 10 million to 13 mil-
lion since 1990.143  This growth continues despite the fact that Florida 
was hit by eight hurricanes and three tropical storms during the 2004 
and 2005 hurricane seasons.144 According to the Florida Department 
of Financial Services, insured losses from the Katrina season are es-
timated to top $10 billion in Florida.145 
III. The Human and Environmental Impacts of FEMA
Disaster Funding
When NEPA was passed, it was intended to preserve the natural 
as well as the human environment.  This section will solely address 
the environmental and human impacts of Hurricane Katrina, and to a 
lesser extent Hurricane Rita.  However, the theory of moral hazard, as 
well as the necessity for engaging in a NEPA process to protect the 
human environment, applies to all hurricane-prone areas of the 
country. 
A. The Human Toll of Hurricane Katrina
The 2005 hurricane season had an enormous impact upon peo-
ple who live along the Gulf of Mexico.  An estimated 1,464 people 
were killed.146  Approximately 400,000 people were displaced from 
their homes.147  Some 50 victims remain missing.148 
B. Environmental Impacts from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
In the wake of the hurricanes, many everyday items were aban-
doned or destroyed, and became environmental pollutants.  The hur-
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Curt Anderson, Tropical Storm Could Threaten Florida, ASSOC. PRESS, (Nov. 19,
2005), available at http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=1328677. 
145. Id.  Total damages are estimated to be more than $20 billion.  Freddy
Cuevas, Hurricane Wilma Heads for Central America, ASSOC. PRESS, (Oct. 19, 2005), available 
at http://www.breitbart.com/news/2005/10/19/D8DBB8K09.html. 
146. Dan Barry, A City’s Future, and a Dead Man’s Lost Past, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2006 at 1. 
147. Centers for Disease Control, Surveillance in Hurricane Evacuation Centers,
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY, Jan. 20, 2006, available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/ 
preview/mmwrhtml/mm5502a3.htm. 
148. Barry, supra note 146.
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ricanes damaged or ruined nearly 160,000 homes, creating approxi-
mately 22 million tons of debris.149  None of the wood debris from 
New Orleans could be disposed of outside of New Orleans, because it 
might spread highly destructive Formosan termites.150  Instead, the 
wood has to be burned, using a method that is intended to limit — 
but does not eliminate — emissions.151  As of February 28, 2006, six 
months after Hurricane Katrina, only 54 percent of the debris had 
been removed.152 
As of October 2005, garbage trucks in New Orleans had collected 
approximately 4.6 million cubic yards of waste.153  The U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers estimated that the total amount of waste col-
lected would exceed 17 million cubic yards.154  This figure does not in-
clude the waste from abandoned cars and boats, or homes that 
needed to be destroyed.155 
As much as five million gallons of toxic household waste were 
scattered throughout this debris.156  Bleach, cleaners, paint, and other 
toxic materials that most people keep around the house contributed 
to this toxic waste.  Additionally, the government must clean up 
ozone-depleting materials in destroyed refrigerators, along with mer-
cury and other heavy metals in destroyed televisions, microwaves, 
and computers.157  The retrieval and removal of the pollutants in re-
frigerators alone can take over a year.158 
Nearly 350,000 vehicles were destroyed and deserted after the 
hurricanes.159  Oil, gasoline, tires, and electrical switches in the vehi-
cles have to be removed before the vehicles can be recycled.  Electri-
cal switches for anti-lock braking systems and lights for doors, trunks 
and glove boxes contain mercury, which is toxic to humans.160 
149. Dan Lothian & Rick Sanchez, CNN, Storms Turn Everyday Items to Toxic Trash
(Oct. 5, 2005), available at http://www.cnn.com/2005/TECH/science/10/05/hurricanes. 
toxins/index.html. 
150. Randy Lee Loftis, Environmental Experts Contemplate New Orleans' Rebirth, DAL-
LAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 27, 2005. 
151. Id.
152. FEMA Press Release, supra note 126.
153. Tom Hays, New Orleans Faces Massive Debris Problem, ASSOC. PRESS, Oct. 20,
2005, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-10-20-katrinadebris_x. 
htm. 
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Lothian, supra note 149.
157. Id.
158. Tom Hays, New Orleans Faces Massive Debris Problem, supra note 153.
159. Lothian, supra note 149.
160. Id.
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The EPA waived Clean Water Act rules that normally would for-
bid the dumping of contaminated water into Lake Pontchartrain.161  
This relaxation of the rules allowed billions of gallons of untreated, 
polluted water to flow into Lake Pontchartrain.162 
Additionally, the very efforts that FEMA takes to mitigate the 
impact of hurricanes can contribute to environmental problem of ur-
ban sprawl.  One of the first trailer parks created in the wake of Hurri-
cane Katrina covers 62 acres of former farmland on the outskirts of 
Baker, Louisiana.163  Many similar sites were under construction; in 
Louisiana, 18 sites began construction, with FEMA attempting to ob-
tain land for 38 more.164  FEMA built seven trailer parks in Mississippi, 
and negotiated to purchase 15 more sites.165  Although these sites are 
smaller than the site in Baker, Louisiana, these developments still 
caused an enormous loss of open space.166 
IV. FEMA's Preparation of an EIS Would Serve the Purpose
of NEPA
A. FEMA's Planning is a Major Federal Action Significantly
Affecting the Environment
First, the NFIP and the National Hurricane Program meet the 
triggering requirement of NEPA: both are major federal actions that 
significantly affect the environment.  An action is an activity, project 
or program that a federal agency finances, conducts, regulates, or ap-
proves.167 FEMA finances and conducts both programs.  Each program 
costs billions of dollars a year, a significant outlay of federal re-
sources, bolstering the determination that both actions are "major." 
Accordingly, the National Flood Insurance Program and the National 
Hurricane Program are both major federal actions. 
161. Loftis, supra note 150.
162. Id.  Senator James Inhofe of Oklahoma, the Republican chairman of the Sen-
ate Environment and Public Works Committee, introduced a bill that would allow the En-
vironmental Protection Agency to suspend its standards for four months during the 
Katrina cleanup, with the possibility to extend this relaxation up to eighteen months to 
allow the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to waive or modify the 
application of certain requirements, S. 1117, 109th Cong. (2005).  This bill was referred to 
the Committee on Environment and Public Works, but was not enacted.  Id. 
163. Martin, supra note 117.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. TREATISE, supra note 11.
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Second, FEMA's actions have "a reasonably close causal rela-
tionship"168 to the environmental effects of increased population 
growth as well as the environmental and human impacts from inade-
quate hurricane response and planning.  Increased population 
growth is a reasonably foreseeable indirect effect of FEMA's disaster 
planning.169  CEQ's regulations specifically include within the defini-
tion of "indirect effect" policies that induce growth and other effects 
related to growth rate, as well as the attendant impact on the envi-
ronment.170 
As analyzed in the moral hazard section, FEMA's hurricane and 
flood planning have taken much of the personal risk out of living in a 
hurricane-prone area.  Although people choose to move to coastal 
areas for many different reasons, FEMA's NFIP and National Hurri-
cane Program have removed much of the personal risk of living in 
hurricane-prone areas.  Thus, FEMA has removed the costs of moving 
into these areas, leaving only the benefits of living in a coastal area. 
Accordingly, a rational cost-benefit analysis prior to a move into a 
hurricane-prone area does not accurately reflect the true cost of living 
in a hurricane zone — including rebuilding, evacuation, and hurri-
cane response. 
Studies have shown that these areas have grown at a higher rate 
than other areas of the country.171  People continue to move into hur-
ricane-prone areas in increasing numbers, possibly because they do 
not have to personally bear the brunt of the cost of a hurricane. 
Therefore, increased population growth and the attendant environ-
mental effects are reasonably foreseeable effects of FEMA's NFIP and 
National Hurricane Program. 
Also, even if the theory of moral hazard does not completely ex-
plain the extreme population growth in coastal areas, FEMA's inade-
quate hurricane response has had a significant impact upon the natu-
ral and human environment.  Many of the impacts upon the human 
and natural environment outlined in Sections III.A and III.B could 
have been avoided through more deliberate and effective hurricane 
damage response and hurricane preparedness, which are two of the 
three prongs in FEMA's National Hurricane Program.172  Accordingly, 
the impacts on the natural and human environment bear "a reasona-
bly close causal relationship"173 to FEMA's disaster planning. 
168. Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 774 (1983).
169. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (b) (2005).
170. Id.
171. McCormick, supra note 4.
172. NFIP FAQs, supra note 82.
173. Metro. Edison Co., 460 U.S. at 774.
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Thus, increased population growth and the environmental im-
pacts outlined in Sections III.A and III.B are both effects of FEMA's 
programs, and must be analyzed in an EIS if their impact on the envi-
ronment is significant. 
Third, FEMA's hurricane and flood programs significantly affect 
the environment.  FEMA must look at both the context of the action 
and the intensity of the impact of the action to determine the signifi-
cance of an environmental effect.174  The context of the action in-
cludes the impact on society at both a regional and national level.  In 
the case at hand, disaster funding and increased population growth 
in coastal areas have both a regional effect and a national effect.  The 
whole country was immeasurably affected by the human suffering 
caused by Hurricanes Rita and Katrina, and the nation's taxpayers 
will continue to pay for the considerable cost of responding to the 
hurricanes.  Regionally, the hurricanes significantly impacted the 
human and natural environment, as discussed in Sections III.A and 
III.B.
The CEQ has listed nine factors that are used to determine the 
intensity of an action. 175  Applying these nine factors, the impact on 
the environment from FEMA's programs is also intense.  First, 
FEMA's actions clearly affect public health and safety, because the 
more people present in these areas, the more likely they are to die or 
experience negative impacts from hurricane-related damage.  Second, 
the area affected by FEMA's actions is distinctive, because it encom-
passes the whole coastline of the southeast and the Gulf coast.  As 
subtropical coastline, the natural areas affected by FEMA's actions 
are significantly different from the rest of the U.S. coastline, including 
the New England coast and the Pacific coast.  Third, FEMA's actions 
are not controversial.  However, all of the factors are intended to be 
weighed together; this factor alone will not eliminate the need for an 
EIS. 
Fourth, as shown by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, hurricanes can 
cause great damage to the human environment, including high death 
tolls.  Hurricanes also pose a considerable risk to environment; FEMA 
plans can help mitigate environmental damage if they are well-
executed.  Fifth, FEMA's actions clearly have set precedent for similar 
future actions, because FEMA continues to develop its programs 
without thinking critically about the environmental impacts.  Sixth, 
the cumulative impact of hurricane damage and FEMA's responses, 
while not easily measured, can be seen in the continuing devastation 
in and around the Gulf Coast.  Applying the seventh factor, it is clear 
that the devastation from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita has affected 
174. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (2005).
175. Id.
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culturally and historically important resources, from New Orleans' 
jazz heritage to Mardi Gras.  Eighth, it is likely that an increase in 
population growth, as well as the negative impacts once a hurricanes 
occurs, has an impact on endangered or threatened species.  There 
are 23 species listed as threatened or endangered in Louisiana, 90 in 
Texas, 34 in Mississippi, 96 species in Alabama, and 108 in Florida.176  
Therefore, FEMA plans likely have a significant impact on endangered 
and threatened species; a successful recovery plan would consider 
the impact on those species.  Finally, it is unlikely that FEMA's pro-
gram violates federal, state or local environmental protection laws. 
However, even if FEMA's program complies with all other laws, it still 
has a significant impact on the natural environment. 
Thus, an analysis of the context and intensity of FEMA's hurri-
cane planning demonstrates that it is a major federal action that sig-
nificantly affects the natural environment. 
B. An EIS is Required for FEMA's Hurricane Planning and NFIP
Even if an action is a major federal action significantly affecting
the environment, there are three situations in which an EIS would not 
be required: (1) if the action is categorically excluded; (2) if an EA has 
already been prepared; or (3) the agency has no discretion to prevent 
the environmental impacts to be analyzed.  However, none of these 
situations apply to the case at hand.  First, FEMA has not categori-
cally excluded the NFIP and the National Hurricane Program from en-
vironmental review.177  Second, FEMA has never prepared an EA nor 
issued a FONSI for the NFIP or the National Hurricane Program.178  
Third, FEMA has discretion to change the implementation of the 
NFIP and the National Hurricane Program.  One of the purposes of 
the 1994 amendment to the 1968 Act states that the NFIP shall "pro-
vide flexibility in the program so that such flood insurance may be 
based on workable methods of pooling risks, minimizing costs, and 
distributing burdens equitably among those who will be protected by 
flood insurance and the general public."179 
Although FEMA does not have discretion to eliminate either the 
NFIP or the National Hurricane Program, it does have discretion to 
176. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, USFWS Threatened and Endangered Species System
(TESS)  (Nov. 3, 2006), available at http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/StateListingAnd  
Occurrence.do?state=all. 
177. Determination of Requirement for Environmental Review, 44 C.F.R. § 10.8 (2005). 
178. FEMA, Federal Register Notices and Archives, (Mar. 27, 2006) http://www.fema.
gov/library/lib_arch.shtm.  The author also conducted a search of the Federal Register 
database for “FEMA” and “Environmental Assessment” and “NFIP,” as well as “FEMA” 
and “Environmental Assessment” and “National Hurricane Program” and did not find 
an Environmental Assessment for the NFIP nor for the National Hurricane Program. 
179. 42 U.S.C. § 4001(d)(2) (2006).
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decide many aspects of the NFIP, such as which areas are Special 
Hazard Flood Areas.180  Special Hazard Flood Areas are areas in which 
every building owner must purchase flood insurance, based upon 
their location in the 100-year floodplain.181  However, there is no rea-
son that FEMA could not require flood insurance for all areas within 
the 500-year floodplain, rather than the 100-year floodplain.  An EIS 
could also analyze the price of NFIP insurance premiums, and the de-
terrent effect (or lack thereof) that NFIP pricing has on people moving 
into flood and hurricane-prone areas.  These are just a few of the al-
ternatives that FEMA could analyze in its EIS of the NFIP. 
Additionally, FEMA has discretion in how it implements the Na-
tional Hurricane Program.  The program has three separate goals, in-
cluding mitigation before the hurricane occurs.182  FEMA's mitigation 
of the impact of hurricanes includes, among other things, assessing 
building performance after significant hurricanes and coastal storms, 
developing designs for hazard-resistant construction in new buildings 
and retrofitting techniques for existing buildings, and recommending 
improvements to state and local regulatory programs.183  FEMA could 
include within its focus of mitigation significant public education 
about the risk of relocating to hurricane zones.  If FEMA were to heav-
ily publicize the health, property, and environmental risks of relocat-
ing to hurricane zones, fewer people might become victims of the 
storms.  This is just one alternative that FEMA could reasonably ana-
lyze in its EIS of the National Hurricane Program. 
Accordingly, FEMA has discretion in the way that it implements 
the NFIP and National Hurricane Program.  Because FEMA has dis-
cretion in the way that it implements its NFIP and National Hurricane 
Program, it similarly has discretion to prevent or ameliorate the envi-
ronmental effects of these programs, including increased population 
growth in coastal, hurricane-prone zones.  Therefore, an EIS is not 
precluded for FEMA's lack of discretion to prevent the environmental 
effect. 
Because FEMA's NFIP and National Hurricane Program are ma-
jor federal actions significantly affecting the natural environment, 
and they are not precluded by a Categorical Exclusion, EA, or FEMA's 
lack of discretion to change the environmental effect, an EIS would 
be appropriate. 
180. NFIP Description, supra note 77.
181. Id.
182. FEMA, National Hurricane Program, supra note 109.
183. Id.
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C. Preparation of an EIS Would Fulfill the Purpose of NEPA
NEPA articulates two purposes behind the preparation of an
EIS.  First, an EIS is meant to improve agency decision-making184 by 
ensuring that all environmental impacts are discovered and consid-
ered before resources are committed.185  Second, an EIS makes all of 
the pertinent information available to citizens and other affected par-
ties who might help in the decision-making process.186 
1. An EIS Would Allow for the Analysis of Environmental
Impacts Before Resources Are Irretrievably Committed
Congress intended NEPA to improve decision-making by facili-
tating a rational discussion of the environmental impacts of an action 
before the action occurs.  Applying the "rule of reason" approach, the 
preparation of an EIS would improve FEMA's decision-making.  Cur-
rently, FEMA has irretrievably committed resources by promising the 
American people that FEMA will always be there to react to a hurri-
cane.  In essence, the American people have relied on the notion that 
FEMA will always protect them from hurricanes.  FEMA's programs 
now operate to mitigate the impacts of disasters, after the disaster 
occurs.  Instead, an EIS would allow for an open and thorough analy-
sis of the environmental risks associated with FEMA disaster plan-
ning.  FEMA could accordingly craft its program with an understand-
ing of the environmental hazards of its actions. 
According to the theory of moral hazard, people are more likely 
to assess the risks of moving into a hurricane zone, if they know that 
they alone are responsible for the costs of a hurricane.  People tend to 
increase certain behaviors if another party is partially or fully bearing 
the cost of risky behavior.  In the case at hand, the benefits of living 
in a coastal area might still outweigh the costs of living in a hurricane 
zone, even if FEMA's disaster programs did not exist.  However, the 
presence of FEMA's disaster programs ensures that most people 
never truly weigh the full costs and benefits of living in a hurricane 
zone. 
FEMA's programs fall directly into the theory of moral hazard. 
People continue to move into hurricane zones, assuming that FEMA 
will provide flood insurance and responses to hurricanes, no matter 
what the cost to the human or natural environment. 
Once a hurricane occurs, there is no way to assess the risks of 
FEMA's NFIP and National Hurricane Program, because the emer-
gency situation demands that those plans be executed.  This type of 
184. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1 (2005).
185. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. at 349.
186. Id.
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commitment of resources without prior analysis is exactly what Con-
gress intended to avoid with NEPA. 
Instead, FEMA should complete a full EIS analyzing the envi-
ronmental impacts of the current implementation of the NFIP and the 
National Hurricane Program.  As stated above, one indirect effect of 
these programs is to encourage people to move into these areas. 
More people results in more houses, cars, boats, electronics, and 
other possessions that must be cleaned up after a devastating hurri-
cane.  Additionally, strong hurricanes can result in the release of mil-
lions of gallons of toxic waste into the environment, simply from 
household chemicals that many people use every day. 
Preparation of an EIS would not necessarily mandate that FEMA 
change its actions under the NFIP and the National Hurricane Pro-
gram, because NEPA does not require an agency to take the most en-
vironmentally sound option.  Instead, the preparation of an EIS 
would ensure that FEMA has adequately analyzed the environmental 
risks of encouraging population growth in coastal areas, and made its 
decision with a full awareness of the risks. 
2. Preparation of an EIS Would Inform the Public of the
Environmental Impacts of Disaster Funding
Congress also intended NEPA to act as tool for disseminating 
information.  The preparation of an EIS would allow for public input 
into FEMA's decision-making process.  It would ensure that those af-
fected by FEMA's plan, including people living in hurricane areas, 
people deciding whether to move into hurricane zones, and people 
who want to protect coastal areas, would have a voice in the decision. 
Additionally, with adequate information the public can put 
pressure on FEMA to improve its programs.  Along with a full analysis 
of the environmental risks and the cost to taxpayers of FEMA's cur-
rent plan, the public would be given an opportunity to make sugges-
tions for improvement.  Regardless of whether the public actually re-
quests a change to FEMA's programs, the information in an EIS 
would fulfill Congress' intent that the public be informed of environ-
mental impacts. 
Conclusion 
Living and working in hurricane-prone areas can have significant 
— although not fully recognized — costs to the human and natural 
environment.  A FEMA-prepared EIS would help to rationally analyze 
these costs before another catastrophic hurricane such as Hurricane 
Katrina. 
The public deserves an analysis of the risks of living in hurri-
cane-prone zones, as well as the actions necessary to reduce the im-
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pact of hurricanes on the human and natural environment.  Republi-
can House Speaker Dennis Hastert stated, in reference to New Or-
leans, "it makes no sense to spend billions of dollars to rebuild a city 
that's seven feet under sea level."187  Accordingly, preparation of an 
EIS by FEMA regarding its NFIP and National Hurricane Program 
would fulfill Congress's intent in enacting NEPA and the amended 
National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, by providing information to the 
public and carefully analyzing the environmental risks of the current 
implementation of these programs. 
187. Assoc. Press, Hastert: New Orleans “could be bulldozed,” SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 2,
2005, at A13. 
